The word “prudent” gets thrown around a lot, and it is often misused. Recently, a friend posed a question to me about the prudence of the forthcoming SSPX consecrations, and it was not the first time I had been asked. There are, of course, many people who are sympathetic to the Society of St. Pius X to varying degrees. The consecration of bishops without papal approval, however, is something that troubles many consciences, for obvious reasons.
I understand that people of goodwill come down on different sides of this question, and that is entirely understandable given the profoundly confusing period in which we live. When questions are genuinely in dispute, men of goodwill can reach different conclusions based on the same facts, depending on how they weigh and assemble them. In this article, I will argue that the forthcoming consecrations are, in fact, prudent. I will also address the legacy of Archbishop Lefebvre’s own consecrations in the light of recent events. But first, we must establish what prudence actually is, and what it is not.
What Prudence Is—and Is Not
If you ask the average man on the street what prudence means, you will likely get a blank stare. If you ask the average Catholic, you will probably hear something like: “to act prudently is to make a calm decision without being hasty.” That is certainly one aspect of prudence, but it is incomplete. In the interest of brevity, the definition I offer here is a concise and condensed version of the more elaborate treatments found in classical theological and spiritual works; my personal favourite being found in the devotional book Divine Intimacy.
Prudence does not mean inaction. It means waiting prayerfully for Providence to manifest in a clear way, consulting wise counsel, making a decision based on all available information, and then acting on that decision without delay.
Critically, a prudent decision involves choosing between two possible goods, not simply choosing the good over the evil. Choosing good over evil is morally obligatory, strictly speaking. Prudence is required precisely when two legitimate goods are in tension, and a decision must be made between them.
Consider a familiar example. A father of a family often faces decisions of this kind. Providing for his family financially is a genuine good. Being present with his family is also a genuine good. Being close to home while working is yet another good. Now suppose a financially strapped family is presented with a position that would require the father to travel or work significantly longer hours, but would substantially improve their economic circumstances. There is no one-size-fits-all answer. He might accept the position; or he might instead choose to downsize, relocate to a more affordable location, and find work that keeps him closer to home, accepting a lateral financial move in exchange for greater presence and a relative financial upgrade. Different fathers could make either decision rightly, because the answer depends heavily on circumstance. The point is this: prudential decisions are, in part, relative to circumstance. They involve choosing between competing goods, not between good and evil.
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